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Humans and other animals discount the value of future rewards, a phenomenon known
as delay discounting. Individuals vary widely in the extent to which they discount future
rewards, and these tendencies have been associated with important life outcomes.
Recent studies have demonstrated that imagining the future reduces subsequent
discounting behavior, but no research to date has examined whether a similar principle
applies at the trait level, and whether training visualization changes discounting. The
current study examined if individual differences in visualization abilities are linked to
individual differences in discounting and whether practicing visualization can change
discounting behaviors in a lasting way. Participants (n = 48) completed the Vividness of
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and delay discounting task and then underwent a
4-week intervention consisting of visualization training (intervention) or relaxation training
(control). Contrary to our hypotheses, participants who reported greater visualization
abilities (lower scores) on the VVIQ were higher discounters. To further examine this
relationship, an additional 106 participants completed the VVIQ and delay discounting
task. In the total sample (n = 154), there was a significant negative correlation between
VVIQ scores and discount rates, showing that individuals who are better visualizers
are also higher discounters. Consistent with this relationship but again to our surprise,
visualization training tended, albeit weakly, to increase discount rates, and those whose
VVIQ decreased the most were those whose discount rates increased the most. These
results suggest a novel association between visualization abilities and delay discounting.
Keywords: delay discounting, visualization, future thinking, intertemporal choice, imagination
INTRODUCTION
Humans often make decisions that involve tradeoffs between immediate and delayed
consequences. For example, smokers enjoy the immediate pleasure of smoking a cigarette even
though they may understand the long-term consequence of continued use. The extent to which
an individual rejects large rewards in the future to obtain smaller rewards available immediately
is known as delay discounting (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Humans and other animals frequently
discount the delayed consequences of their actions (Chung and Herrnstein, 1967; Mazur, 1984;
Rachlin et al., 1991; Frederick, 2003). A reward that is delayed has a reduced effect on behavior
compared to the same reward provided immediately. In humans, delay discounting can be
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 289
fpsyg-08-00289 March 2, 2017 Time: 16:34 # 2
Parthasarathi et al. Visualization and Discounting
measured by giving people choices between immediate and
delayed rewards and using these choices to estimate their
discount rate, an index of the extent to which the value of delayed
rewards is discounted relative to immediate ones. Discount rates
vary widely across individuals (Frederick et al., 2002; Kable and
Glimcher, 2007), but are remarkably stable across time within an
individual (Baker et al., 2003; Ohmura et al., 2006; Kirby, 2009;
Senecal et al., 2012). Higher discount rates (steeper discounting)
are associated with a variety of maladaptive behaviors, including
drug and alcohol abuse, smoking, and obesity (Kirby et al.,
1999; Petry, 2001; Audrain-McGovern et al., 2004; Kirby and
Petry, 2004; Madden and Bickel, 2010; MacKillop et al., 2011).
High discount rates are also associated with poorer academic
performance (Duckworth and Seligman, 2005; Kirby et al.,
2005), a greater likelihood of mortgage default (Meier and
Sprenger, 2012), and greater likelihood of divorce (Reimers et al.,
2009). Given these associations between steep discounting and
important life outcomes, there is keen interest in understanding
the psychological processes that drive individual differences in
discounting, and in developing interventions that could impact
discounting in a lasting way.
One process that could account for individual differences in
discounting is an individual’s ability to vividly imagine future
outcomes. Some theoretical accounts of discounting stress how
delayed outcomes are less vivid or less concrete than immediate
outcomes (Trope and Liberman, 2003; Rick and Loewenstein,
2008). Related computational models show how discounting
could arise from a prospective process that mirrors retrospective
memory – akin to a distant memory, an outcome in the far future
is harder to bring to mind (Kurth-Nelson et al., 2012). While
speculative, these process models could be linked to normative
models that provide reasons for discounting future outcomes
based on their uncertainty (Sozou, 1998; Redish and Kurth-
Nelson, 2010), if vividness serves as a psychological cue for
the certainty of a future outcome. Functional imaging studies
support the notion that discount rates may depend on such
prospective processes. Blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
signal in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a region
engaged when individuals are simply imagining the future,
predicts individual discount rates (Ersner-Hershfield et al.,
2008; Mitchell, 2009; Cooper et al., 2013). Specifically, lower
discounters exhibited greater vmPFC activation when thinking
about the far future, while higher discounters exhibited greater
vmPFC activation when thinking about the near future (Cooper
et al., 2013). In addition to these links to individual differences,
recent studies have shown how engaging visualization processes
can change discounting. Several studies have now demonstrated
that asking people to call to mind a future event reduces
the extent to which they discount a delayed reward in a
subsequent choice, and the size of this effect is correlated
with the vividness of the imagined event (Peters and Büchel,
2010; Benoit et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013; Lin and Epstein,
2014).
However, the effects of imagining a future event on
discounting that have been demonstrated to date are short-lived
and do not seem to persist past the immediately subsequent
choice. Whether there are more stable associations between the
ability to imagine future events and discounting, and whether
these abilities can be altered in a longer-lasting manner, is
unknown. In the current study, we ask if individual differences in
visualization are linked to individual differences in discounting,
and whether these abilities and discounting can be changed in
a lasting way after training in visualization. We hypothesized
based on previous work that a greater ability to vividly
imagine events would be associated with reduced discounting,
and that visualization training would lead to a decrease in
discount rates. Surprisingly, though, we found the opposite
association, and furthermore practice with visualization tended
to both increase the ability to vividly imagine and to increase
discounting.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Visualization Training Intervention
Experiment
Participants
Forty-eight paid volunteers (33 females, 15 males; mean
age = 24.6 years, SD = 6.5 years) from the University of
Pennsylvania community participated in this study examining
the effects of visualization training on discounting. All
participants were healthy adults without any physical and/or
mental illnesses. Ten participants did not complete the training
period and therefore did not return for a follow-up visit
to complete the study. The mean age of the final sample
(N = 38, 28 females, 10 males) was 24.7 years (SD = 6 years).
All participants provided consent in accordance with the
procedures of the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Pennsylvania.
Tasks
All participants completed two testing sessions, an intake session
before the intervention (range = 8–28 days, median = 18 days)
and a follow-up after the intervention (range = 3–19 days,
median = 7 days). At each visit, participants completed
the same battery of decision-making tasks and self-report
questionnaires. Before the intake session, participants were
randomly placed into either the intervention group (visualization
training) or the control group (relaxation training). The final
sample consisted of 20 participants in the intervention group
and 18 in the control group. At the end of the intake
session, those in the intervention group were also asked to
write down 4–6 goals that they hope to achieve in the
future.
All participants completed five decision-making tasks,
presented on a computer using E-Prime (Psychology Software
Tools, Sharpsburg, PA, USA). Tasks were presented in a random
order for each subject. Our a priori hypotheses concerned the
inter-temporal choice (ITC) task. The ITC task consisted of
102 choices, adopted from Senecal et al. (2012), Experiment 3.
Each choice was between a smaller monetary reward available
immediately or a larger reward available after a delay. Amounts
for smaller rewards ranged between $10–$34, and amounts for
larger rewards were $25, $30, and $35. The delays ranged from
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1 to 180 days. All participants were presented with the same
choices in a random order.
Four additional decision-making measures were administered
for exploratory purposes: risk aversion, in which participants
chose between a smaller amount of money that was certain and
a larger amount that was risky (50% chance of receiving the
reward, Levy et al., 2009); loss aversion, in which participants
chose whether to take a gamble with a 50% chance of
winning some amount and a 50% chance of losing a larger
or smaller amount (Tom et al., 2007); ambiguity aversion,
in which participants chose between playing a lottery with
a fixed 50% chance of winning and another lottery where
the reward was greater but the probability of winning was
uncertain (Levy et al., 2009); and a task that measures the
balance of model-based vs. model-free reinforcement learning
(Gläscher and Büchel, 2005; Otto et al., 2013). As these
tasks do not bear on our a priori hypotheses, detailed
results from these measures will not be included in this
paper.
Questionnaires
Following the battery of decision-making tasks, six self-report
questionnaires were administered to participants using Qualtrics
Online Surveys. The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
(Marks, 1973) was of main interest. The VVIQ is a 16-item
questionnaire that measures individual differences in vividness
of visual imagery. The questionnaire instructs participants
to imagine different scenarios and subsequently rate their
imaginations on a 4-point scale. Studies have reported an
internal consistency reliability of 0.96 for the VVIQ (Rossi, 1977;
Richardson, 1994; McKelvie, 1995; Campos, 2011). The VVIQ
was used to test for an association between vividly imagining
events and delay discounting, and as a manipulation check to
ensure that visualization training in fact affected the ability to
vividly imagine events.
The remaining five questionnaires were exploratory to
test for other possible effects of the visualization training
on self-reported traits: the Attributional Style Questionnaire
(Peterson et al., 1982), measuring optimistic and pessimistic
explanatory styles; the General Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer
and Jerusalem, 1995), assessing perceived self-efficacy; the Life
Orientation Test (revised) (Scheier et al., 1994), measuring
dispositional optimism; the Zimbardo Time Perspective
Inventory Questionnaire (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999), assessing
orientation and attitudes toward time; and the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), measuring dispositional empathy
and perspective taking.
Training
The training period lasted 4 weeks. For both groups, the training
consisted of several 1-h guided meditation sessions conducted in
a group, as well as 5-min online podcasts participants could listen
to on their own.
The 1-h in-person guided meditation sessions were held in
the Meditation Room of the Graduate Student Lounge at the
University of Pennsylvania. Each intervention group underwent
separate meditation sessions, offered 2 days a week, one in the
evening and one mid-day. All sessions were led by the same
instructor, a Health and Wellness Educator at the University of
Pennsylvania and an experienced meditation and mindfulness
instructor. Participants were asked to complete at least six of the
eight in-person sessions offered to their group.
The meditation sessions for both groups were 1 h long
and began with the same relaxation cues. For the visualization
training group, this was followed by goal-oriented guided
visualization. Participants were told to focus on a goal that they
would like to achieve in the future and were led through two vivid
scenarios in which they could imagine overcoming the obstacles
in their way and experiencing the feelings accompanying
achievement of the goal. The meditation sessions for the control
group consisted of guided relaxation, without visualization or
future thinking. Participants were told to bring awareness to their
body and breath, and focused on the physical sensations they
were experiencing in the present moment. (See Supplementary
Material for full-length scripts).
The online podcasts were 5-min voice recordings by the same
instructor, designed to be a shortened version of the in-person
sessions. Participants were asked to listen to the podcast at least
six times a week during the training period.
Payment
Participants were paid a show-up fee of $15.00 for the intake
visit and $10.00 for the follow-up. At both visits, participants
were aware that they could also receive an additional incentive-
based payment according to their choices in one of the five
decision-making tasks.
Each decision making task was designed to be incentive
compatible. At the end of each session, the participant rolled
a die to choose which of the five tasks would determine their
payment. With the exception of the learning task, which was paid
based on total performance, participants rolled a die again to
determine the choice within that task for which they would be
paid. For the ITC task, participants were paid using a Ficentive
gift card (Sunrise Banks N.A., St. Paul, MN, USA), which was
loaded with their earnings either the same day if they chose the
immediate option, or after the specified delay if they chose the
later option. Any gambles selected were resolved by flipping a
coin (risk aversion, loss aversion) or drawing a poker chip from
an envelope (ambiguity aversion).
For the training, participants received $10.00 for every 1-h
meditation session they attended and $1.00 for every 5-min audio
podcast they listened to.
Data Analysis
Discount rates were estimated using a logistic regression model
in MATLAB (Mathworks). Participants’ choice data were fit
with the following logistic function using maximum likelihood
estimation:
P1 = 11+ e−β(SV1−SV2) , P2 = 1− P1
where P1 refers to the probability that the subject chose option 1,
and P2 refers to the probability that the subject chose option 2.
SV1 and SV2 refer to the participant’s estimated subjective value
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FIGURE 1 | Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) scores are significantly correlated with log-k values both at intake (n = 48, r = –0.37,
p = 0.02) and at follow-up (n = 38, r = –0.45, p < 0.01).
of option 1 and option 2, and β is used as a scaling factor. The
subjective value of the options were estimated using a hyperbolic
function:
SV = A
1+ kD
where A is the reward amount, D is the delay, and k is the
participant’s discount rate parameter (Kable and Glimcher, 2007).
Larger values of k indicate a greater degree of discounting future
rewards. To account for the fact that discount rates are not
normally distributed, all statistics were performed on the log-
transformed discount rates.
Since subjects were randomized to group and discount
rates are known to be stable over time, we planned to
evaluate the effects of visualization training using (1) a between
groups t-tests comparing the visualization and relaxation
groups after training, and (2) a paired-sample t-test testing
within subjects differences in the visualization group between
intake and follow-up. We also performed a between groups
t-tests comparing changes after training in the two groups,
equivalent to evaluating the interaction term in a mixed
ANOVA. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to
assess the relationship between discount rates and self-report
measures.
Additional Samples Assessing Individual
Differences
To allow us to examine the relationship between VVIQ and
discount rates in a larger sample, we collected these measures in
two additional experiments. Another 106 paid volunteers from
the University of Pennsylvania community were recruited as
part of two different studies examining the effects of different
manipulations on discount rates. The first study included
49 subjects (30 females, 19 males; mean age = 23.3 years,
SD = 3.6 years), while the second study included 57 subjects
(36 females, 21 males; mean age = 22.3 years, SD = 3.3 years).
All participants provided consent in accordance with the
procedures of the Institutional Review Board of the University
of Pennsylvania.
In both studies, participants came in on the 1st day and
completed the same ITC task (102 questions) and VVIQ as
in the visualization training intervention experiment. While
the first study had no additional tasks or questionnaires on
that 1st day, participants in the second study completed
four other self-reports including the Gratitude Questionnaire
(McCullough, 2002), which measures individual differences in
the level of gratitude; the Grit Scale (Duckworth et al., 2007),
which measures individual differences in perseverance and
passion toward long-term goals; the Brief Mood Introspection
Scale (Mayer and Gaschke, 1988), which measures current
mood; and the Life Orientation Test (revised) (Scheier
et al., 1994). Participants in both studies continued on to
a 2nd day that involved a test of the effects of different
manipulations on discount rates, but those results are not
discussed here.
Participants were paid $10.00 an hour and received an
additional incentive-based payment according to their choices in
the ITC task (as outlined above). Discount rates and VVIQ scores
were calculated in the same manner as above.
RESULTS
Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that people who reported
more vivid visual imagery were higher discounters. In the
participants in our visualization training study, at baseline, VVIQ
was significantly negatively correlated with log-k values (n = 48,
r = −0.37, p = 0.02, note that lower VVIQ scores represent
more vivid visual imagery, Figure 1). In other words, people
with a greater capacity to imagine scenarios vividly on the
VVIQ were less likely to select the larger delayed rewards in the
intertemporal choice task. Since this result was in the opposite
direction of our prediction, we collected VVIQ and discount rate
data from additional subjects to evaluate the robustness of this
relationship in a larger sample. Across all subjects (n = 154),
the negative relationship between VVIQ and log-k values was
attenuated but still statistically significant (r = −0.25, p < 0.01,
Figure 2), indicating that individuals who were more vivid
visualizers (lower VVIQ scores) were higher discounters (higher
log-k values). This relationship persists when controlling for age,
gender, and education [R2 = 0.09, F(4,149) = 3.737, p < 0.01,
b = −0.209, t(149) = −2.599, p = 0.01]. Associations between
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FIGURE 2 | Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) scores were significantly correlated with log-k values across all subjects in all
experiments (n = 154, r = –0.25, p < 0.01).
TABLE 1 | Relationship between inter-temporal choice (ITC) and Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and all other tasks and self-reports
administered in the visualization intervention experiment.
Correlation with ITC pre-training Correlation with VVIQ pre-training Group differences post-training
Tasks n = 48 n = 48 n = 38
Alpha, Risk Aversion r = 0.27, p = 0.07 r = −0.19, p = 0.20 t(36) = 1.29, p = 0.21
Lambda, Loss Aversion r = 0.00002, p = 0.99 r = −0.08, p = 0.59 t(36) = 0.54, p = 0.59
Beta, Ambiguity Aversion r = 0.42, p < 0.01 r = −0.39, p < 0.01 t(36) = 0.61, p = 0.54
Self-Reports
Life Optimism Test – Revised
r = −0.01, p = 0.95 r = −0.25, p = 0.09 t(36) = −0.88, p = 0.38
Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory
Past Negative r = 0.10, p = 0.50 r = 0.10, p = 0.50 t(36) = −0.39, p = 0.70
Present Hedonistic r = 0.13, p = 0.38 r = −0.27, p = 0.06 t(36) = 0.20, p = 0.84
Future r = −0.001, p = 0.99 r = −0.07, p = 0.64 t(36) = 0.55, p = 0.58
Past Positive r = −0.06, p = 0.71 r = −0.19, p = 0.20 t(36) = −1.16, p = 0.25
Present Fatalistic r = 0.17, p = 0.25 r = −0.07, p = 0.64 t(36) = −0.45, p = 0.65
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Perspective-Taking (PT) r = 0.41, p < 0.01 r = −0.45, p < 0.01 t(36) = 0.47, p = 0.64
Fantasy (FS) r = 0.32, p = 0.03 r = −0.34, p = 0.02 t(36) = 0.09, p = 0.93
Empathic Concern (EC) r = 0.22, p = 0.13 r = −0.21, p = 0.15 t(36) = −0.23, p = 0.82
Personal Distress (PD) r = 0.30, p = 0.04 r = −0.13, p = 0.38 t(36) = 0.03, p = 0.97
Self Efficacy Scale
r = −0.007, p = 0.96 r = −0.24, p = 0.10 t(36) = −0.60, p = 0.55
Attributional Style Questionnaire
Good r = 0.09, p = 0.54 r = 0.10, p = 0.50 t(36) = 0.28, p = 0.78
Bad r = −0.0001, p = 0.99 r = 0.02, p = 0.89 t(36) = −0.57, p = 0.57
The first column shows the correlation with log-k values pre-training, the second column shows the correlation with VVIQ scores pre-training, and the third column tests
for group differences between visualization and relaxation groups post-training.
other individual difference measures and discount rates or VVIQ
are reported in Table 1.
Returning to our visualization training study, we examined
the effects of the visualization training on VVIQ scores.
Consistent with our expectations, visualization training tended
to increase the vividness of visual imagery, though this
effect was not robust. After training, the visualization group
(mean = 29.1, SE = 2.23) had significantly lower VVIQ
scores than the control group (mean = 37.33, SE = 3.08)
[t(36) = 2.20, p = 0.03, Figure 3]. Note that there was no
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FIGURE 3 | Visualization training tended to decrease VVIQ. The
visualization group had significantly lower VVIQ scores (i.e., were more vivid
visualizers) after training [t(36) = 2.20, p = 0.03], while there was no significant
difference between the two groups before training [t(36) = 1.07, p = 0.29].
However, there was no significant effect of training within either group
[t(19) = 1.54, p = 0.14 for visualization and t(17) = 0.81, p = 0.43 for control],
and the interaction between group and time on VVIQ did not reach
significance [t(36) = –1.66, p = 0.11]. ∗p < 0.05.
significant difference between the intervention (mean = 32.75,
SE = 2.18) and control (mean = 36.56, SE = 2.85) groups
prior to training [t(36) = 1.07, p = 0.29]. However, there
was no significant effect of training on VVIQ within the
visualization group [t(19) = 1.54, p = 0.14; similar test
in the control group, t(17) = 0.81, p = 0.43], and the
interaction between group (intervention vs. control) and time
(pre- vs. post-training) on VVIQ did not reach significance
[t(36)=−1.66, p= 0.11].
We next examined the effects of visualization training on
discounting. Contrary to our hypothesis, but consistent with
the observed relationship between VVIQ and discount rates,
visualization training tended to increase discount rates, though
again this effect was not robust. After training, the visualization
group (mean = −1.70, SE = 0.19) had significantly higher
discount rates [t(36) = 2.16, p = 0.04] than the controls
(mean = −2.26, SE = 0.17) (Figure 4). Note that there was no
significant difference between the intervention (mean = −1.93,
SE = 0.81) and control (mean = −2.33, SE = 0.60) groups
prior to training [t(36) = 1.73, p = 0.09]. However, there was
no significant effect of training within the visualization group
[t(19)= 1.83, p= 0.08; similar test in control group, t(17)= 1.04,
p = 0.31], and the interaction between group (intervention
vs. control) and time (pre- vs. post-training) did not reach
significance [t(36) = 1.10, p = 0.28]. Exploratory tests revealed
no effects of training on any other measure (Table 1).
Finally, we found that changes in discount rates after training
were correlated with changes in the vividness of visual imagery.
As at baseline, VVIQ and discount rates were negatively
correlated after training (n = 38, r = −0.45, p < 0.01 at follow-
up). Furthermore, there was a significant relationship between
FIGURE 4 | Visualization training tended to increase discounting. The
visualization group had significantly higher discount rates (i.e., were more
impatient) after training [t(36) = 2.16, p = 0.04], while there was no significant
difference between the two groups before training [t(36) = 1.73, p = 0.09].
However, there was no significant effect of training within either group
[t(19) = 1.83, p = 0.08 for visualization and t(17) = 1.04, p = 0.31 for control],
and the interaction between group and time on discount rates did not reach
significance [t(36) = 1.10, p = 0.28]. ∗p < 0.05.
change in log discount rate from pre- to post-training and change
in VVIQ (r = −0.44, p = 0.006). Individuals whose vividness
of visual imagery increased the most were those whose discount
rates increased the most (Figure 5).
DISCUSSION
Here we found that increased trait visualization abilities are
associated with increased discount rates. In a total sample of
154 subjects, there was a significant negative correlation between
VVIQ scores and discount rates, showing that individuals who
are better visualizers are also higher discounters. Furthermore,
consistent with this association between visualization abilities
and discounting, we found that 1 month of repeated practice
of visualizing one’s future goals tended, albeit weakly, to
increase discounting of future rewards. After the intervention,
participants in the visualization group had significantly higher
discount rates than participants in the control group who
performed relaxation exercises without visualization. Causal
inference about the effect of the intervention, though, is
weakened by the fact that the group by time interaction was
not statistically significant. The intervention study did provide
further correlational evidence for the relationship between
visualization and discounting, as post-intervention changes in
VVIQ were significantly negatively correlated with changes
in discount rate. Taken as a whole, these findings provide
converging support for the idea that the ability to vividly imagine
scenes is associated with higher discount rates.
Given the growing evidence that instructing subjects to
imagine future events leads them to discount less in subsequent
choices (Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011; Liu et al.,
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FIGURE 5 | Changes in log-k values after training were significantly correlated with changes in VVIQ scores (r = -0.44, p < 0.01).
2013), we had predicted the opposite association, that more vivid
imagers would discount less and that visualization training would
reduce discounting. Why might visualization abilities, as assessed
by the VVIQ, be associated with steeper discounting?
One possibility is that since questions on the VVIQ ask
subjects to visualize items in the present, the VVIQ specifically
taps into the ability to visualize the present, perhaps at the
expense of the future. If VVIQ measures visualization of the
present, however, it is unclear why practice visualizing future
goals would change VVIQ, as we observed.
A second possibility is that the ability to vividly imagine
can be directed at the present and the future, and on balance
yields further advantage for the already vivid present in tradeoffs
between the two. Past research has shown that visualization in
a concrete mindset raises levels of present-bias, which in turn
increases impulsivity (Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006; Malkoc
et al., 2010). Similarly, in classic experiments on delay of
gratification, manipulations that increased the vividness of both
outcomes (e.g., placing both rewards in front of the children)
reduced delay of gratification and increased impulsivity (Mischel
and Ebbesen, 1970).
A third possibility is that visualizing one’s future goals, in
isolation, reduces rather than enhances one’s motivation toward
those goals. Imagining achieving one’s future goals may serve
as proxy for fulfilling those goals. In addition, visualizing goals
that one has not yet reached, and the potential roadblocks to
those goals, might have provoked anxiety and avoidance. Indeed,
post-experiment feedback from some participants suggested that
visualization training may have also enhanced visualization of
the obstacles to achievement. This focus on goals that might not
be achieved may lead to a sense of deprivation that promotes
increased impulsivity (Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991; Rachlin
and Raineri, 1992). These possibilities are further supported by
the literature on mental contrasting, which shows that imaging
future goals alone does not improve success in achieving those
goals, unless accompanied by making concrete plans as to
how to achieve those goals (i.e., implementation intentions)
(Oettingen, 2000; Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006; Kappes et al.,
2013; Oettingen et al., 2015).
Each of these three possible explanations for the trait
associations we observed can be reconciled with reported state
effects of imagination that go in the opposite direction, given
that participants in studies of state effects imagine only future
events, and these events are typically already planned or easily
possible rather than highly desired goals (Peters and Büchel,
2010; Benoit et al., 2011; Lin and Epstein, 2014). Nonetheless,
our results also lead us to reconsider potential explanations
for why imagining future events has been shown to reduce
discounting. In light of our results, it is possible that engaging
in prospective thought or vivid imagination does not by itself
drive these effects, but rather that imagining certain kinds of
future events engenders positive emotions or reduces arousal that
subsequently decreases discounting. This hypothesis is consistent
with several studies regarding the influence of affect and arousal
on discounting (Lerner et al., 2012; Kim and Zauberman,
2013), and would explain why in some cases imagining future
events increases rather than decreases discounting. For example,
Liu et al. (2013) found that participants were more likely to
choose the immediate reward when imagining negative future
events compared to no imagination; Lempert and Pizzagalli
(2010) demonstrated that when a stressor is present, imagining
an event in the future increases preferences for immediate
reward; and Senecal et al. (2012) showed that engaging in
prospective thought can, depending on the content of such
thought, either increase or decrease discounting of delayed
rewards.
Of course, it is also possible that our reported trait
associations are not about imagination per se, but rather another
personality trait associated with vivid visualization. For example,
extraversion has been associated with lower VVIQ scores, with
more extroverted individuals reporting more vivid imagination
(McDougall and Pfeifer, 2012). It has also been reported that
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extroverted individuals are higher discounters (Ostaszewski,
1996; Hirsh et al., 2008, 2010), though not all studies find
this (Becker et al., 2012; Manning et al., 2014), and reported
associations are often moderated by other variables, such as
cognitive ability (Hirsh et al., 2008) or current levels of positive
mood (Hirsh et al., 2010). Since our study did not measure
extraversion, it is possible that this trait could account for some
of the relationship between visualization and discounting.
A few caveats to this study warrant mention. Both the training
and the VVIQ assessment involved visualization activities that
are fundamentally internal and subjective and thus difficult to
verify. In addition, VVIQ scores could be affected by participants’
potentially faulty sense of how their own imagery compares to
other people. Beyond this subjectivity, the podcast segment of
the intervention was completed at home under conditions we
were unable to monitor. Overall, we believe these considerations
would have made it more difficult for us to detect effects of
visualization training. We also cannot conclude that there are
no favorable effects of visualization training. Though none of
our exploratory variables showed any change, we measured a
limited set of variables. We were also unable to assess whether
participants in the visualization group were more successful in
achieving their goals than they otherwise would have been.
Despite these caveats, our results provide novel evidence
for an association between the vividness of visual imagery and
discount rates. These results help to further delineate the complex
relationship between episodic future thinking, vivid and concrete
imagery, and delay discounting. Imagining possibilities more
vividly may not always be the most productive path to increased
patience.
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